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ABSTRACT Thanks to the excellent learning capability of deep convolutional neural networks (CNN),
monocular depth estimation using CNNs has achieved great success in recent years. However, depth
estimation from a monocular image alone is essentially an ill-posed problem, and thus, it seems that this
approach would have inherent vulnerabilities. To reveal this limitation, we propose a method of adversarial
patch attack on monocular depth estimation. More specifically, we generate artificial patterns (adversarial
patches) that can fool the target methods into estimating an incorrect depth for the regions where the patterns
are placed. Our method can be implemented in the real world by physically placing the printed patterns in
real scenes. We also analyze the behavior of monocular depth estimation under attacks by visualizing the
activation levels of the intermediate layers and the regions potentially affected by the adversarial attack.
INDEX TERMS Adversarial attack, monocular depth estimation, CNN.
I. INTRODUCTION
Estimating pixel-wise depth from 2-D images has become
increasingly important with the recent development of
autonomous driving, augmented realities (AR), and robotics.
A large body of previous work has been devoted to depth esti-
mation from stereo or more than two images [1]–[4]. At the
same time, monocular depth estimation [5]–[8], in which
depth is estimated from a single image,1 has attracted
attention due to its less demanding hardware requirements.
Monocular depth estimation has been greatly enhanced by
the excellent learning capability of deep convolutional neural
networks (CNN). As a result, current state-of-the-art results
with monocular depth estimation are quite impressive, and
seemingly comparable to those with stereo methods (see
Fig. 1, where (a) is the input image and (b) is the depth
estimated by Guo et al. [7]). However, monocular depth esti-
mation is essentially an ill-posed problem because a monoc-
ular image alone does not contain sufficient physical cues
The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and
approving it for publication was Syed Islam .
1Generally, monocular depth estimation includes techniques that use a
temporal sequence of images captured from a single camera [9]–[11]. How-
ever, in this article, we focus on methods that use only a single image from
a single viewpoint for depth estimation.
for scene depth. Instead of using the physical cues, these
methods seem to rely on implicit knowledge (e.g., the color,
vertical position, or shadows) that are learned from the train-
ing dataset [12]. We argue that monocular depth estimation
depends too much on non-depth features in the given image,
which makes it quite vulnerable to attacks.
To reveal the limitation mentioned above, we propose a
method of adversarial patch attack for CNN-basedmonocular
depth estimation. Specifically, we generate artificial patterns
(adversarial patches) that can fool the targetmethods into esti-
mating an incorrect depth for the regions where the patterns
are placed. Figure 1(c) shows an example of our adversarial
patches superimposed on the input image. As shown in (d),
Guo et al.’s method [7] failed to estimate correct depth in
the region where the patch was located; closer depth values
were obtained than the original result in (b), as was intended
with our design for this pattern. In this case, the attack was
conducted in a digital manner; we digitally manipulated the
pixel values of the input image to superimpose the patch. Our
method can also be implemented in the real world, and
we have achieved similar effects by physically placing the
printed patterns in a real scene.
Moreover, to further analyze the behavior of monoc-
ular depth estimation under attacks, we visualize the
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FIGURE 1. Monocular depth estimation [7] and our adversarial patch
attack.
activation levels of the intermediate layers (Fig. 1(e)) and
the regions that are potentially affected by adversarial attacks
(Fig. 1(f)). These visualizations lead to a deeper under-
standing of the mechanism by which adversarial patches
affect the target CNN. Our source code, learned patches and
demo video are available at https://www.fujii.nuee.nagoya-
u.ac.jp/Research/MonoDepth.
II. BACKGROUND
A. ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
1) DIGITAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
Biggio et al. [13] were the first to demonstrate that deep neu-
ral networks (DNN) could be deceived by vicious attacks on
the input. After that, a number of different adversarial attacks
were proposed for image classification tasks [14]–[19]. Their
purpose was to find small perturbations to be added to
the original image to cause mis-classification. Compared to
classification tasks, fewer works have been conducted for
regression tasks. Hendrik Metzen et al. [20] demonstrated
that nearly imperceptible perturbations could also fool an
image segmentation method into producing incorrect results.
Following their work, Xie et al. [21] proposed a method
that can deceive both segmentation and object detection
models simultaneously, and Wei et al. [22] extended the
target of attack from an image to a video. More recently,
Zhang et al. [23] attacked monocular depth estimation.
It should be noted that these methods implicitly assume
‘‘digital adversarial attack’’, in which the attacks are imple-
mented by digitally manipulating the pixel values on the input
image. The perturbation pattern is usually designed to have
small amplitude, and thus, the difference between the original
image and the attacked image is imperceptible to the human
eye. However, the perturbation patterns usually cover the
entire image, which makes it unsuitable to implement them
in the real world.
2) PHYSICAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACKS
A number of studies have also been conducted on ‘‘physical
adversarial attacks’’ that can be implemented in the real
world, e.g., by placing printed patterns in a target scene.
These patterns are not necessarily designed to be impercepti-
ble to the human eye depending on the applications [24]–[27].
Kurakin et al. [28] demonstrated that images with adver-
sarial patterns for a classification task created in [15] would
remain adversarial when they are printed and captured by
cameras. Athalye et al. [29] extended this idea to 3D phys-
ical adversarial objects. Eykholt et al. [30] showed that stop
signs can be misclassified if various stickers are placed on
top of them. Their adversarial objects were designed to be
indistinguishable to the human eye, similarly to the case with
‘‘digital adversarial attacks’’.
In a similar vein, Brown et al. [24] took a small designed
patch (adversarial patch), which was clearly visible to the
eye, and placed it in target scenes to induce errors in a
classification task. Their patches were designed to be placed
anywhere in an input image. Moreover, as their patches are
independent of target scenes, they can be used for ‘‘physical
adversarial attacks’’ without prior knowledge of lighting con-
ditions, camera angles, or other objects in the target scene.
This is not trivial, as a pattern located in the real world
usually receives a series of transformations (e.g., geometric
transform, digitization, and color gamut transform) before
it is recorded in a digital image, which would invalidate
the effect as an adversarial pattern [31]. Following [24],
adversarial patches have been used in several tasks such
as face recognition [25], object detection [26] and optical
flow estimation [27]. Komkov and Petiushko [25] attacked
face recognition by sticking an adversarial patch on a hat.
Ranjan et al. [27] conducted an adversarial patch attack on
optical flow that is, to our knowledge, the first work to apply
adversarial patch attacks to a regression problem. Note that
our method can also be located in the context of adversarial
patch attack for a regression problem.
B. MONOCULAR DEPTH ESTIMATION
Monocular depth estimation refers to the process of pre-
dicting pixel-wise depth from a single image. As a seminal
work, Eigen et al. [32] proposed a multi-scale CNN archi-
tecture that can produce pixel-wise depth estimation from a
single image. Unlike other previous works in single image
depth estimation [33]–[38], their network did not rely on
hand crafted features. Since then, significant improvements
have been made by using techniques such as incorporation
of strong scene priors for surface normal estimation [36],
conditional random fields [39], conversion from a regression
problem to a classification problem [40], and a quantized
ordinal regression problem [6]. Lee et al. [8] achieved state-
of-the-art result by introducing novel local planar guidance
layers located at multiple stages in the decoding phase. All
of the methods mentioned above are trained in a supervised
manner, where ground-truth depth taken by RGB-D cameras
or 3D laser scanners are required to train the networks.
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FIGURE 2. Overview of the proposed method.
Recently, semi-supervised and unsupervised methods have
also been proposed. As examples of the semi-supervised
approach, Chen et al. [41] used relative depth information
and Kuznietsov et al. [42] used sparse depth data obtained
from LiDAR. As for the unsupervised approaches, they
require only rectified stereo image pairs to train networks.
Xie et al. [43] proposed Deep3D to create a new right
view from an input left image using depth image-based
rendering [44], where a disparity map was estimated as
an intermediate product. Garg et al. [45] extended this
using a network similar to FlowNet [46]. However, since
their network was not fully differentiable, they performed
a Taylor series approximation to linearize their loss, which
made the optimization difficult. To address this problem,
Godard et al. [5] introduced differentiable bilinear sam-
pling [47] into the framework of Xie et al. [43]. Addition-
ally, they considered left-right consistency of the predicted
disparities estimated from the given pair of stereo images.
Their network consisted of an encoder and a decoder, where
the encoder’s structure was taken from VGG-16 [48] and
the decoder was composed of stacked deconvolution layers
and shortcut connections from the encoder. More recently,
Guo et al. [7] adopted the concept of knowledge distilla-
tion [49], and trained their monocular depth estimation net-
work to produce the same disparitymaps as the ones that were
predicted by a pre-trained stereo depth estimation network.
van Dijk and de Croon [12] analyzed the behavior of
monocular depth estimation and argued that depth prediction
would actually depend on non-depth features such as the
vertical position and the texture.
C. OUR CONTRIBUTION
We propose a method of adversarial patch attack for
CNN-based monocular depth estimation methods. Similarly
to some previous works [24]–[27], the patches used for our
attack are recognizable to human eye. Zhang et al. [23] also
attacked monocular depth estimation using imperceptibly
small perturbation patterns covering the entire image, but
their method was not applicable to the real world. In con-
trast, our patch-based approach enables physical attacks using
printed patterns located in the target scene. Our method is
similar to Ranjan et al.’s [27], which attacks optical flow
CNNs using printed patches that are physically located in real
scenes. We would like to stress several differences between
our work and Ranjan et al.’s [27]. First, our method is
designed to cause depth errors only around the patches rather
than the entire image frame. Moreover, our method considers
perspective transform [30] in the image formation model
to increase the robustness of the attack in the real world.
Finally, our target is monocular depth estimation, which we
feel has inherent vulnerabilities due to its over-dependence
on non-depth cues. To the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to attack monocular depth estimation in real scenes.
We also visualize the behavior of monocular depth CNNs
under attack, which will contribute to a deeper understand-
ing of monocular depth estimation in concert with other
approaches (e.g., van Dijk and de Croon’s [12]).
III. PROPOSED METHOD
A. OVERVIEW
Figure 2 illustrates the overview of our method. Given
a target monocular depth estimation method implemented
as a CNN, our goal is to derive an adversarial patch
(denoted as P) that induces the target method to produce
incorrect depth estimates for the region on the input image
where the patch is located.
Our method is designed to be implemented in the real
world; namely, we want to deceive the target method by phys-
ically placing printed patches in the target scene. To achieve
this goal, we need to consider various shooting conditions
in physical settings. When a patch is printed and placed
in the target scene, it is subject to a series of transforma-
tions (luminance change, geometric transformations, noise,
etc.) depending on the shooting condition before it is finally
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recorded in a digital image. Therefore, the imaging process
of the patch is modeled so as to cover various shooting
conditions.
Moreover, we implement the imaging process as fully
differentiable so that the gradient with respect to the estimated
depth can be propagated back to the patch through the net-
work. During the training stage, we keep the target method’s
network unchanged and update only the adversarial patch
through the framework of back-propagation. We utilize the
Adam optimizer [50] for this purpose. We could also utilize
custom-made iterative updating rules such as FGSM [15], but
we found that using the Adam optimizer led to better results.
B. MODEL OF IMAGING PROCESS
LetF be the targetmonocular depth estimation CNNand I the
original input image. The estimated depth map is represented
as D = F(I ). The adversarial patch we aim to derive is
denoted as P. We assume that the patch P receives various
transformations Tθ through the imaging process and finally
falls into the region Rθ in the input image. The attacked image
is represented as Iˆ = I +Rθ Tθ (P), where +Rθ refers to the
pixel overwriting on the region Rθ .
We aim to train the patch P so that the depth values in the
region Rθ become a certain depth value dt , regardless of the
actual depth. This is formalized as
argmin
P
∑
(i,j)∈Rθ
∣∣dt − Fi,j(I +Rθ Tθ (P))∣∣ , (1)
where (i, j) denotes a pixel coordinate in the estimated depth
map. By minimizing Eq. (1), we force the estimated depth in
the region Rθ to be a specific depth value dt. Depending on
the value of dt, the estimated depth is guided to be different
from the actual depth.
The patch P should be robust to various transformations
in the imaging process. Therefore, we randomly change
the transformation Tθ for each mini-batch during train-
ing. Specifically, Tθ includes random brightness shifts (in
the [−0.05, 0.05] range), contrast shifts (in the [0.9, 1.1]
range), addition of noise (in the [−0,1, 0.1] range), scal-
ing (with factors of [0.1225, 0.2025]), and rotation (in
[−20, 20] degrees). Finally, the patch P receives perspective
transformation, in which four vertices of the unit square
((0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)) are randomly perturbed as
(vx , vy) 7→ (vx + u, vy + v) (u, v ∈ [−0.1, 0.1]), (2)
where (vx , vy) represents each vertex of the unit square
and u, v represents horizontal and vertical shifts, respec-
tively. Only a single patch is used to cover different
spatial resolutions, since we include a larger range of scal-
ing than [27] in the transform (in [27], several patches
were learned for different resolutions). We used a suffi-
ciently large resolution for the patch (256 × 256 pixels) to
reduce the unexpected effects of pixel interpolation when
printing it.
C. LOSS FUNCTION
Our loss function is defined for the target adversarial patch P
and is composed of three terms,
L = Ldepth(P)+ αLNPS(P)+ βLTV(P), (3)
where α and β are weighting coefficients that are determined
experimentally.
1) DEPTH LOSS
The most important term in our loss function, the depth loss,
Ldepth, is given in accordance with Eq. (1).
Ldepth(P) =
∑
(i,j)∈Rθ
∣∣dt − Fi,j(I +Rθ Tθ (P))∣∣ . (4)
When we attack more than one monocular depth estimation
methods simultaneously, we replace Eq. (4) with the ensem-
ble depth loss Lensdepth, as
Lensdepth =
∑
k
∑
(i,j)∈Rθ
∣∣∣dt − Fki,j(I +Rθ Tθ (P))∣∣∣ , (5)
where Fk denotes the k-th network.
2) NON-PRINTABILITY SCORE (NPS)
We included NPS [51] in our loss function to limit the color
space of the patch within the printable color gamut, as
LNPS(P) =
∑
i,j
min
Ec∈C
∥∥Epi,j − Ec∥∥1 , (6)
where ‖.‖1 denotes the L1 norm and pi,j denotes the color
vector of a pixel (i, j) in the patch P. We seek the closest color
vector c from the set of printable colors C . A smaller LNPS
means better printability.
3) TOTAL VARIATION (TV)
Non-smooth patches are more likely to be affected by aliasing
artifacts when they are printed and captured by a camera.
Therefore, we encourage the smoothness of the patch P by
using total variation (TV) loss, similarly to [52].
LTV(P) =
∑
i,j
√
(pi,j − pi+1,j)2 + (pi,j − pi,j+1)2. (7)
D. IMPLEMENTATION
1) TARGET METHODS
As the target of our proposed attack, we used two state-of-
the-art monocular depth estimation methods [7], [8].
Guo et al.’s method [7] is trained in an unsupervised man-
ner using knowledge distillation. Their network consists of
an encoder and a decoder. The encoder part is implemented
using VGG-16 [48] and the decoder part is composed of
stacked deconvolution layers and skip connections. The out-
put from the network is a disparity map, which is converted
into the depth map using the relation:
disparity = (baseline ∗ focal length)/depth, (8)
VOLUME 8, 2020 179097
K. Yamanaka et al.: Adversarial Patch Attacks on Monocular Depth Estimation Networks
FIGURE 3. Results of digital adversarial attacks.
where the baseline and the focal length were provided in the
KITTI dataset.
Meanwhile, Lee et al.’s [8] takes a supervised training
framework, where the estimated depth is directly supervised
by the corresponding ground-truth. Their network consists
of an encoder and a decoder as well, but the structures are
more complex than Guo et al.’s [7]; DenseNet-161 [53] was
adopted as the encoder, and atrous spatial pyramid pool-
ing [54] and local planar guidance layers were used in the
decoder. This method is one of the top performing monocular
depth estimation methods in the KITTI benchmark [55].
These two networks were pre-trained on the KITTI
dataset [56] using a data-splitting rule proposed by
Eigen et al. [32]. The Eigen split consisted of 22,600 stereo
image pairs for training, 888 for validation, and 697 for
testing.
2) TRAINING DETAILS
We trained adversarial patches under several conditions.
We tested two target depths (dt = 3 m and 150 m) and three
target configurations (individual and simultaneous attacks to
either and both of [7] and [8]).
For training of our adversarial patch, we used only the left
view images from the Eigen’s 22,600 training split [32]. The
width and height of the input images were set to 512 and
256 pixels, respectively to fit the input size of the target
networks. The input images were randomly augmented by
horizontal flipping, zooming with a factor of [0.8, 1], gamma
correction in the range of [0.8, 1.2], illumination change
with a factor of [0.8, 1.2], and color jittering in the range of
[0.95, 1.05]. The resolution for the patch was set to 256×256
pixels, but its apparent size in the input image was changed
by the patch transformer Tθ .
We used a Linux-based PC equipped with a NVIDIA
Geforce GTX 1080 Ti. The networks were implemented
using Python version 3.6.9 and PyTorch [57] version 1.1.0.
We used the Adam optimizer [50] with learning rate 10−3,
and batch size was set to 8. The number of epochs was 40.
The resulting adversarial patches are shown in Fig. 4.
FIGURE 4. Adversarial patches trained with various conditions.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. DIGITAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
We implemented the digital attack by superimposing the
patches shown in Fig. 4 onto input images. Figure 3 shows the
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FIGURE 5. Results of digital adversarial attacks by P1n and P
1
f on Guo et al.’s method [7].
input images (w/ and w/o the attack), estimated depth maps,
and the difference between the original and attacked depth
maps.
As shown in (a), our attack was quite effective for
Guo et al.’s method [7]; in both cases, namely, where the
patch was trained exclusively for Guo et al.’s method [7] and
where it was trained for both the methods [7], [8], the network
produced incorrect depths corresponding to dt in the regions
where the patches were located.
In contrast, as shown in Fig. 3(b), the attack had a limited
effect for Lee et al.’s method [8]; in particular, the patches
trained for both methods were less effective. One possible
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FIGURE 6. Results of physical adversarial attacks.
FIGURE 7. Results of physical adversarial attacks on Guo et al.’s method [7] under various conditions.
reason for this is the higher complexity of Lee et al.’s
method [8] compared to Guo et al.’s [7], which would bring
more robustness to attacks. However, we conclude that our
attack was effective to some extent because significant depth
errors were induced by the adversarial patches.
It should be noted that simultaneous attack was possible
for both methods, which had different network structures and
training strategies. See the results with P∗n and P∗f in Fig. 3.
This would indicate the inherent vulnerability of monocular
depth estimation, where few geometric cues are available
from the input image itself.
To further demonstrate the effectiveness of our attack,
we present additional results on Guo et al.’s method [7]
in Fig. 5, which shows that our adversarial patches were
effective in various conditions (location, scale, orientation,
and background).
B. PHYSICAL ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
We also conducted a physical adversarial attack by using
the printed adversarial patches. Figure 6 shows several input
images and estimated depth maps. We can see a similar ten-
dency as the one with the digital adversarial attack: namely,
the attack was less effective against Lee et al.’s method [8]
than Guo et al.’s [7]. In particular, the effect of P2f on
Lee et al.’s method [8] was almost non-existent. This is
seemingly related to the property of Lee et al.’s method that
the estimated depth is closely related to the vertical position
in the image; P2f (dt = 150 m) was placed near the bottom
of the image, where Lee et al.’s method is more likely to
produce small depth values. In contrast, when P2f was placed
near the top of the image, we obtained a result closer to
our intention (see Fig.8). To conclude, both of the monoc-
ular depth estimation methods could be attacked in the real
world, although the results were not always sufficient against
Lee et al.’s method.
FIGURE 8. Successful case of our attack on Lee et al’s method [8].
In Fig. 7, we present more results of the physical
adversarial attack against Guo et al.’s method. In (b), the
patch P1f was located upright, but in (c) and (d), it was rotated
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FIGURE 9. Results on visualizing potentially affected regions. Red lines indicate the region of Rθ .
by ± 15 degrees. The attack was effective for all three cases,
indicating the robustness of the adversarial patch derived by
our method. In (e), we can see that the patch P2f (trained
for Lee et al.’s method) had little effect on Guo et al.’s
method, although the appearance of P2f was similar to that
of P∗f , and in (f), P∗f was effective on the same method.
This indicates that similarity to the human eye does not
always correspond to the similarities to the depth estimation
methods.
Please refer to the supplementary video for more results.
V. ANALYSIS THROUGH VISUALIZATION
As discussed in the previous section, the effect of our adver-
sarial attack was spatially localized in the resulting depth
map; incorrect depth estimates were induced only in the
regions around the adversarial patches. To analyze this effect,
we present two methods for visualizing the effects of adver-
sarial patches. First, we visualize the potential regions on a
depth map where the depth values are likely to be affected
by an adversarial patch. Second, we visualize the network’s
activation incurred by the adversarial patch, which helps to
analyze the mechanism where the adversarial patch induces
incorrect depth estimates. We use digital attack (adversarial
patches superimposed by manipulating the image digitally)
for this analysis, similarly to the work of van Dijk and de
Croon [12]. We adopted Guo et al.’s method [7] as the target
of visualization.
A. POTENTIALLY AFFECTED REGIONS
Given a region Rθ for an adversarial patch to be placed in
the input image I , we can predict the potential effect on the
resulting depth value D(u, v) for a pixel (u, v) as
H (u, v) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
c
∑
(i,j)∈Rθ
∂D(u, v)
∂I (i, j, c)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ , (9)
where D = F(I ). In the above equation, the partial deriva-
tive can be obtained by standard back-propagation. The map
H (u, v) shows how much the estimated depth of each pixel
(u, v) is potentially affected by the adversarial patch located
at Rθ . Note here that we only consider the location Rθ , and
do not specify the pattern for the adversarial patch. There-
fore, with this visualization, we actually analyze the intrinsic
sensitivity of the pre-trained target network F .
Figure 9 shows an example of this visualization. The orig-
inal input image and an attacked image are shown in (a), (b),
and (c) from which Guo et al.’s method [7] predicted the
depth maps shown in (d), (e), and (f), respectively. Shown in
(g) is H (u, v), a prediction of the potentially affected region,
where Rθ was set to the region of the adversarial patch in
(b) and (c). To verify this prediction, the difference between
(d) and (e) is presented in (h) and the difference between
(d) and (f) is presented in (i). As we can see, the predicted
region in (g) was well aligned to the resulting depth differ-
ences in (h) and (i).
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FIGURE 10. Results on visualizing activation map of Guo’s network [7]. Top row: input image. Middle row: estimated depth maps. Bottom row:
visualization results. Red lines indicate the region of Rθ .
B. NETWORK ACTIVATION
For classification tasks, a well known method for visualiz-
ing network activation is Grad-CAM [58]. This method can
be applied only for classification tasks, where the output
from the network is typically a global label and no spatial
information is involved. However, in our case, the output
from the network is a pixel-wise depth map that depends
on the location of a pixel. Therefore, we extend the idea of
Grad-CAM to our problem as follows.
First, we focus on the encoder part of the target network F .
We obtain a layer-wise activation map for a spatial position
(u, v) in the output depth map D(u, v) as
Gu,vm (i, j) =
∑
k
∣∣∣∣ ∂D(u, v)∂Akm(i, j) · Akm(i, j)
∣∣∣∣ , (10)
where Akm(i, j) is the k-th feature map of the m-th convolution
layer and (i, j) denotes the spatial location on the feature map.
We then resize activation maps Gu,vm (i, j) to the same size as
the input image by bilinear interpolation and aggregate them
over all the encoder’s layers. We finally take the summation
over the regions (u, v) ∈ Rθ to obtain the final activation map,
as
G(i, j) =
∑
(u,v)∈Rθ
(∑
m
Resize(Gu,vm (i, j))
)
. (11)
This activation map shows the extent to which spatial neigh-
bors are involved for the erroneous estimates on (u, v) ∈ Rθ ,
when an adversarial patch covers the region Rθ .
We present an example in Fig. 10, where input images,
depth maps, and activation maps (G(i, j)) are shown for three
cases: (a) without attacks, (b) attacked by P1n, and (c) attacked
byP1f . In all cases,Rθ was set to the same region (the region of
the adversarial patches). It should be noted that the activation
heavily depended on the presence of the adversarial patches:
in (a), the activation covered a wide area around Rθ , but
in (b) and (c), the activation seemingly concentrated on Rθ .
These results suggest that the adversarial patches attracted the
attention of the target method to itself, which in turn led to
incorrect depth estimation, as intended.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proposed a method of adversarial patch attack
for CNN-based monocular depth estimation methods. The
adversarial patches were trained to induce incorrect depth
estimation around the region where they were located, in the
presence of various transformations such as perspective trans-
form, scaling, and translation. We demonstrated that our
method can be implemented in the real world by placing
a printed pattern in the target scene. We also analyzed the
behavior of monocular depth methods under attack by visu-
alizing the potentially affected regions and activation maps.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to achieve
physical adversarial attacks on depth estimation methods.
Our future work will include extending our method to similar
tasks such as optical flow estimation and stereo depth esti-
mation. We hope our work will lead to a wider recognition of
the vulnerability of monocular depth estimation methods and
thus to the development of safer depth estimation techniques.
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